War and Diplomacy in Kashmir- C Dasgupta

***/*****                                                                                                                                                          History 

War and Diplomacy in Kashmir-1947-1948

C Dasgupta

               

                Kashmir is one of the most incendiary region in South Asia in the present times and has been a tinderbox for almost seven decades now. Deliberate lies, allegations and counter allegations by the involved parties have enveloped the kernel of truth in innumerable layers of obfuscating details. There has been a plethora of books on the issue. Each author has an opinion that is difficult to dissociate from his nationality and basic creed. Like any other long running controversy, truth is now hidden and what is peddled in its place is a popular myth that has as many versions as the opining minds.

               

                In this foggy air, where one cannot see clearly the events of merely a few years back, not to speak of seven decades old history, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta’s book is like a penetrating beam of bright light. With remarkable clarity he narrates the events around 1947 that led to the conundrum that is Kashmir today. His narrative is terse. He eschews obscure analysis of the diplomatic shenanigans that characterise any such tussle between neighbouring countries. As the title of the book suggests, he confines his account to the low-intensity war between India & Pakistan that raged for months in 1947-48 and the diplomatic efforts that unfurled simultaneously in Delhi, Pakistan, Britain & USA.

                It is a little appreciated fact- I had only vague inklings of this- that Britain played a very important role in the development of Kashmir fiasco. War over Kashmir between India & Pakistan was strange in that for many months following the birth of these two nations, their military chiefs were British. Lord Mountbatten was the Governor General of India. He also presided over the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. These officers were mostly upright and honest in discharge of their duties but they owed their primary loyalty to their country, Britain. Their decisions were thus more aligned to British interests and policy in this region than to the country that they allegedly served. In 1940s British policy for this region i.e. South Asia underwent a paradigm change. Pakistan because of its geostrategic location and Muslim majority emerged as a more important ally of Britain than India. Oil of Middle East had begun to influence International relations. Britain alienated Arabs by abandoning Palestinian Mandate in later part of 1948. It feared that if they were perceived to be favouring India over Pakistan the whole Muslim world would turn hostile to them. Thus, at least some of the mandarins in Whitehall went out of their way to placate and appease Pakistan in the ongoing Kashmir tussle. They gave short shrift to the principles that had earlier guided them in forming opinion about the controversies that had risen during partition of land between two nations. Kashmir was treated differently from other areas like Junagadh & Hyderabad which faced similar predicament. British military officers and diplomats in India and Pakistan were advised to prevent full-scale war between two British dominions at all costs even if it involved certain dubious manoeuvring of political and military decisions and diplomatic legerdemains. Thus, Mountbatten cleverly coaxed Nehru to ask for UN mediation in Kashmir. Indian government including Nehru was absolutely against UN’s mediation in the Kashmir struggle. If at all they had conceded a role for UN it was the supervising of plebiscite that too after establishment of peace and complete withdrawal of Pakistan sponsored tribal raiders from Kashmir. Britain at every stage restrained India in its legitimate actions to defend its territory in whatever way it perceived advantageous to its interest, but willingly overlooked Pakistan’s blatant excesses and on occasions even encouraged these. I was amused to see similarity in Pakistan’s present policies toward India and their behaviour in 1947-48. Pakistan it seems had mastered the art of exploiting its instability and frailty as a nation within a few months of its birth. It successfully curried major favours from Britain by raising the bogey that if Pakistan faced defeat from India, rebellious elements in its polity will deliver it to communist bloc, a thought enough to excite flutter in Whitehall, in the mid-twentieth century.

                Dasgupta has done a great job by demystifying these events. He must have had access to many documents that governments of India & UK declassified with the passage of time in the later part of twentieth century. Though he confines himself to the narration of events as they unfolded, book doesn’t read like a collection of dry facts. His narration is racy but shorn of any unwanted adornments. Some maps would have furthered understanding of the military campaigns described.

                Any person interested to know about the genesis of Kashmir problem must read this book. Author convincingly and adroitly brings out the dubious role played by Britain in shaping this unending imbroglio.